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1. Introduction: Matter and Zabarella's Methodology 
The sixteenth-century philosopher Jacopo Zabarella (1533-1589) 
stands near the end of the long Aristotelian dominance of western aca-
demic philosophy. Yet, despite the fact that Aristotelianism was soon to 
be overwhelmed by other currents of thought, Zabarella's influence on 
western thought would continue into at least the nineteenth century, 
and he still provides useful discussions relevant to today's Aristotle 
scholars.! In what follows, I discuss the existence and essence of mat-
ter, and show how Zabarella argues for his claims. What is especially 
notable about the existence and essence of matter as a topic is that 
matter is clearly at the center of his well-known interest concerning 
the nature of scientific methodology. 
In his work De regressu, Zabarella sets forth, in a programmatic 
way, his account of scientific reasoning. In this methodological treatise, 
he gives pride of place to the example of matter as fitting precisely the 
requirements of the theory. At the same time, though, his discussion of 
matter in the De regressu is highly compressed, which is not surprising 
since it is only proposed as an example. Rather more surprising is that 
scholars writing on the De regressu do not pay attention to Zabarella's 
fully developed account of matter in his work De prima rerum materia. 
That is an unfortunate oversight since the discussion of matter in the 
De prima rerum materia provides us with a chance to see Zabarella 
working on a problem that he thinks is eminently suitable for his 
account of scientific methodology. By using these two works to illumi-
nate each other, I hope to provide an insight into the unity of 
Zabarella's methodological concerns and his philosophy of nature. 
In what follows, then, I am interested in exploring what Zabarella 
thinks about matter only insofar as it relates to his methodological con-
cerns. Of course, he is part of a long tradition of discussion about the 
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nature of matter as a kind of being (ens)-the De prima rerum materia 
contains a long discussion of that topic. Yet an exhaustive discussion of 
Zabarella's attempt to bring this nature to light would distract us from 
observing the way in which his method of regress us is present in the 
treatise on prime matter. In fact, Zabarella himself makes a distinction 
that justifies my treatment of the issue when he points to two different 
ways of thinking about matter. There are, he writes, two considerations 
(considerationes), or notions (notiones), of matter. In brief, we can think 
about matter absolutely as it is in itself, or we can think about it rela-
tively, that is, as a principle of other things: 
Some things are attributed to a man insofar as he is a man, and 
other things are attributed to him insofar as he is a father. So too, 
some things are attributed to matter according to its fIrst notion 
and as a being [ens], but other things are attributed to it in terms of 
its second notion insofar as it is a principle and referred to other 
things.2 
While I shall explain the importance of this distinction and its philo-
sophical significance in the third part of the essay, for now it is suffi-
cient to note it as providing an explanation for the focus of what fol-
lows. 
As a final prelude to the discussion of matter and methodology, it is 
worth pausing to notice Zabarella's general procedure in the De prima 
rerum materia. After disentangling some issues in a debate between 
Scotists and Thomists concerning the idea of prime matter in God's 
mind, Zabarella essentially dismisses the topic: "But let us abandon 
theological disputation about this issue .... My purpose [consiliuml is 
not to dispute in a theological manner [Theologice], but in an 
Aristotelian one [Aristotelicel."3 
In fact, Zabarella never wanders too far from an Aristotelian orbit 
concerning any philosophical problem, and he makes clear his goal for 
the treatise on prime matter when he says that by the end of the work 
"I shall have endeavored (if I can) to make clear the truth and the opin-
ion of Aristotle about prime matter."4 The obvious reading of this goal is 
that the truth and Zabarella's account of Aristotle's opinion are one and 
the same. We receive striking confirmation of Zabarella's unswerving 
commitment to Aristotelian language when he writes: 
We say properly and absolutely that substances are generated and 
corrupted, but we say less properly and, as they say, relatively 
[secundum quid], that accidents are generated and corrupted. For if 
water is generated from air, we say simply [simpliciter] that water 
comes to be. But if water comes to be warm from cold water, we do 
not say simply that the water comes to be, but that the water 
becomes warm. Hence, we conclude [colligimus] that the same 
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change [mutatio] in accidents can be called both generation and 
motion [motus] because of various considerations. For we can call 
that warming of the water 'generation' insofar as something warm 
comes to be from what is not warm, having been formed 
[formatum] by something having been taken away [privatum]. But 
insofar as there is a passage [transitus] from cold to warm, from 
form to form, and, as they say from something positive to some-
thing positive, to that extent it is called motion [motus].5 
In addition to introducing us to some terms central to his ensuing dis-
cussion, this passage, with its iterations of "we say" and "as they say," 
also has about it the unmistakable air of an invitation to, or even an 
initiation into, a way of thinking about the issue of change. Placed just 
prior to Zabarella's discussion of the existence of prime matter, it also 
shows that he recognizes that there is a strong connection between the 
phenomena associated with change and the introduction of prime mat-
ter. That connection will prove crucial to my explication of Zabarella's 
account of prime matter. 
2. Induction and the Existence of Prime Matter 
In his De regressu, Zabarella sets forth a scientific methodology known 
as regressus. The outline of the theory looks simple enough. There are 
three steps involved. Having noticed some effect existing in nature, we 
ask about the cause of that effect. We then proceed to demonstrate the 
existence of that cause through a demonstration showing that the 
cause exists. Zabarella calls this first demonstrative argument either a 
"demonstration quia" or a "demonstration from an effect." But this 
demonstration only gives us knowledge that a cause exists, while we 
are left unsure of the nature of the cause. Consequently, we consider 
the nature of the cause, coming to some understanding of its nature. 
Once we have clarified the nature of the cause, we can use that known 
cause to argue back to the effect in a demonstration that shows why 
the effect follows from the cause. This latter demonstration Zabarella 
calls a "demonstration propter quid."6 Zabarella summarizes regress us 
in the following way: "It is a certain sort of reciprocated demonstration 
such that after we have demonstrated the unknown cause from the 
known effect, we convert the major premise and then demonstrate the 
same effect through the same cause, so that we might know why it is.''7 
Of course, this is only meant as an overview. By actually looking at the 
example of prime matter, we will gain a better sense ofZabarella's pro-
ject. 
In the third chapter of the De prima rerum materia, Zabarella 
attempts to prove the existence of prime matter. He entitles the chap-
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ter "Concerning the Discovery of Prime Matter" (De Inventione Primae 
Materiae), though "discovery" may be a misleading way of thinking 
about what Zabarella is really doing, if by discovery we mean some-
thing along the lines of a modem view of experimentation.8 As with 
many of his technical terms, it is best to let any definition emerge from 
its use. So, when Zabarella claims to discover the existence of prime 
matter, he does so with the following argument: 
(1) Where there is substantial change, there is a subject matter. 
(2) In all natural bodies, there is substantial change. 
Therefore, 
(3) In all natural bodies, there is a subject matter.9 
He accepts the second premise as obviously true, but recognizes that 
the first premise is anything but obvious. He notes that the subject of 
the generation of air from water is not at all apparent to the senses. By 
contrast, it is quite evident to the senses that the subject stays the 
same when cold water becomes hot. So, while there is no problem with 
recognizing one subject underlying any accidental change, he needs to 
show how we can produce an argument that would also hold for cases 
of substantial change. This very short argument raises quite a number 
of issues and we need to proceed cautiously here. He is clearly accept-
ing as a base-line assumption that substantial change exists-e.g., air 
becomes water-on the basis of sense. Zabarella is not in the business 
of calling into question such Aristotelian starting points. Thus, he tells 
us that the minor premise is obvious (manifestum). Yet it must be 
admitted that calling the premise "obvious" only makes sense within an 
Aristotelian framework, so we should recognize that "obvious" is ulti-
mately a theory-laden term for him. What proves to be obvious is 
merely that which Zabarella already knows as a good Aristotelian. The 
lesson here is that it may be more important to see how Zabarella 
proves the existence of matter than to worry about whether the proof 
actually succeeds. Zabarella already knows prime matter exists, but 
the discovery of prime matter is very much a methodological issue 
related to explaining what he knows. 
Moving on to the major premise, then, how can we know it to be 
true? Zabarella argues that we need a broader claim that will apply to 
the more particular claim of the argument's major premise. What we 
need, in fact, is to show that: 
(4) A subject is required in all cases of change. 
If that can be shown to be true, then it can be shown that: 
(5) There must be a subject for substantial change. 
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And (5), of course, is simply (1) slightly restated. Zabarella is thus pin-
ning his hope on the possibility that by starting with the most obvious 
case of change requiring a subject-that is, easily observable accidental 
change-we can come to know by a certain proportion (proportione 
quadam) that a non-observable subject is required for substantial 
change. 10 
The process by which we can move from accidental change to all 
change is characterized as "induction." He provides us with a descrip-
tion of the role induction can play in acquiring the knowledge that will 
justify the major premise: "This is the power [vis] of demonstrative 
induction: that from the enumeration of some particulars, the essential 
connection [essentialis connexus] of the predicate with the subject 
comes to light [in lucem] from which we know it to be so in the remain-
ing particulars."l1 For this reason, then, Zabarella plans to make use of 
a demonstrative induction designed to elicit knowledge of a universal 
proposition. Again, though, this description of induction is theoretically 
rich, and in order to see the point of his argument for the major 
premise, we would do better to pay attention to his methodology. That 
methodology rests on an elaborate foundation of types of knowledge. 
Zabarella recognizes four levels of knowledge. The basis for distin-
guishing such levels is two-fold. On the one hand, the type of knowl-
edge is indexed to the role of the known object within a theory. So, 
those objects that are effects are known differently than those that are 
causes. On the other hand, cognition itself can be of two types: confused 
and distinct. Zabarella summarizes: 
We cognize the effect confusedly when, without cognition of its 
cause, we know the effect. We cognize the effect distinctly when we 
cognize it through the cognition of the cause. Indeed, the former is 
called cognition that it is, the latter why it is, and at the same time 
what it is, since it is the same thing to cognize what it is and why it 
is .... Now the cognition of a cause is also sometimes confused and 
sometimes distinct. Indeed, it is confused when we cognize that it 
is, but are ignorant about what it is, but it is distinct when we cog-
nize also what it is, and penetrate into its nature.12 
From this four-fold distinction, it should be clear that there is no such 
thing as knowledge simply speaking, and when Zabarella states that 
the minor premise of his syllogism is "obvious," we need to know 
exactly what the status of our knowledge of that premise is. So too, 
when he writes of the "power of induction," we need to know just what 
kind of knowledge is generated by induction. 
In addition, Zabarella has given an account of the various ways in 
which knowledge of causes and effects can be gained. The highest form 
of knowledge is demonstrative knowledge, which proceeds from distinct 
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knowledge of the cause and demonstrates the necessary connection of 
the effect with the cause, thereby providing distinct knowledge of the 
effect. The other type of demonstrative knowledge is a demonstration of 
the cause through the effect. The first tells us what the essence of 
something is, while the latter merely shows that the relevant thing 
exists. Hence, the knowledge gained of the cause is confused in relation 
to its essence-that is, we do not know what it is. Zabarella summa-
rizes: 
For all scientific advance [progressus] from the known to the 
unknown is either from a cause to an effect or from an effect to a 
cause. The former indeed is the demonstrative method; but the lat-
ter is the resolutive method. There is no other process that brings 
forth certain knowledge of a thing. For if we advance from some-
thing to something else, neither of which is the cause of the other, 
it is not possible for there to be an essential or necessary connection 
between them. Hence, no certain cognition can follow from the 
advance. Therefore, it follows that there is no scientific method 
besides the demonstrative and resolutive ones.1S 
At the same time, though, Zabarella recognizes two types of resolution. 
One, which is properly called a "demonstration from an effect," is used 
to make clear that which is exceedingly obscure and hidden. The other 
type of resolution starts with what we know, but where what we know 
needs a little additional explanation. This second type of resolution is 
induction. 14 
The key to understanding the distinction between demonstration 
from an effect and induction rests on what we know by nature, where 
"known by nature" means that which is sensible.15 Zabarella advances a 
rather broad notion of what is sensible, though, since the category of 
sensible things includes not only those things that are singular, but 
also those universals whose singulars are sensible. So, for example, the 
universal 'human being' can be considered sensible not because we see 
the universal but because individual human beings are sensible. In 
addition to this sortal notion of what is known by nature, Zabarella 
also holds that certain sorts of propositional claims are known by 
nature, for example, "human beings are bipedal." We need only observe 
an individual human being to know that any human being is bipedal. 
The point here is that such propositional knowledge is immediate (sta-
tim) and not inferential. Everything known by nature, whether sortal 
or propositional, is known by what Zabarella calls a "proper light" (pro-
prius lumen), and such non-inferential knowledge is the result ofinduc-
tion. 
By contrast, what is unknown by nature is either unable to be 
sensed from its singulars or requires some inferential process through 
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which it can be known. To illustrate the sortal notions not known by 
nature, Zabarella points to prime matter and states that matter is not 
known by a proper light, but is made known by another light. In fact, 
since it is completely hidden from the senses, it is never known per se, 
but is made known through another, namely, through the notion of 
generation. As an example of propositional knowledge that is not 
known by nature, Zabarella mentions the claim that "a triangle has 
three angles equal to two right angles." This propositional fact is 
unknown by nature because the predicate cannot be discerned by the 
senses, but must be known through another. In other words, no matter 
how long we look at it, mere inspection of a triangle will never show us 
that these three angles before us are equal to two right angles. For that 
knowledge, we need a demonstration. 
A natural question to ask next is what underwrites the distinction 
between what is known per se and what is known through another. The 
distinction rests on the fact that there are two different sorts of princi-
ples, namely, those that can be known directly by the senses (or 
through induction based on sensory experience) and those that cannot 
be known through the senses and must be known some other way. Now 
there is an ambiguity in the term ''principle," since, as Zabarella notes, 
there are principles of a thing, principles of a science, and principles of 
knowing. Despite this proliferation of different types of principles, 
Zabarella insists that what they have in common is that they can either 
be known by the senses or they must be known through a demonstra-
tion. It is the former sort of principle that can be known per se, and 
whether that is a principle of a science or an intrinsic principle of an 
existing thing, its knowledge is unmediated and induction will play a 
role when going beyond the knowledge of the singular. 
In summary, then, the notion of induction that Zabarella possesses 
is a method by which we can go immediately from particular instances 
to the universal, whether the universal be a sortal notion or a proposi-
tional one. While it is useless in leading us to what is unobservable, it 
is useful, thanks to the natural light of the mind, in helping us to know 
the universal of which the particulars are instances. Hence, induction 
is merely a process by which we come to "see" the universal in the par-
ticular. 
Returning now to the argument for the existence of prime matter in 
the De prima rerum materia, we can fill out the programmatic text 
from the De regressu with an actual example of Zabarella constructing 
an induction. The first point to stress is that in Zabarella's description 
of the induction that warrants the claim that a subject is required in all 
cases of change, he explicitly flagged that the induction would proceed 
by a "certain proportion." It turns out that by "proportion" he means 
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that the induction is based on the following analogy: Just as bronze is 
related to a statue, so prime matter is related to a composite substance. 
In addition, just as the bronze existing prior to the statue is not actu-
ally a statue, but is potentially a statue, so too prime matter grasped as 
prior to being informed is not actually any being (ens), but is poten-
tially any being.16 It must be admitted that this quick analogy seems 
insufficient to warrant acceptance of the universal proposition that a 
subject is required in all cases of change. Does Zabarella really think 
that induction is this easy and certain? He provides a bit more clarifica-
tion by describing the type of analogy he is using: 
The analogy is a proportion, which since it is a likeness of ratios 
[rationum], cannot be between two [terms] (since a ratio is between 
two), but is between four [terms]. Hence, when we compare two 
ratios among themselves and say they are similar, we consider four 
terms (or three if one is assumed twice and takes the place of two 
terms). For we say that four has a double ratio to two; thus twelve 
has a double ratio to six. Therefore, since the same ratio exists for 
each, we say that twelve is related to six in this way-as four is 
related to two. And this is called analogy.17 
With this sense of analogy in place, Zabarella continues: "And, so, 
through this analogy prime matter is known since it corresponds by a 
proportion to the subject of accidental change. "18 
Through this analogy Zabarella thinks that he can assert that there 
is a subject matter presupposed in all instances of change, and since 
that is a universal statement that shows a necessary connection 
between the subject matter and change, the more particular claim that 
there is a subject matter underlying substantial change is justified. In 
this way, he has his demonstration from an effect and has proven to his 
satisfaction the existence of prime matter. Nonetheless, the reader of 
Zabarella can be forgiven for thinking that this induction in support of 
the existence of prime matter underlying substantial change is brief 
and lacks a certain probative force. Is this merely a case of Zabarella 
having a "bland confidence"19 in the intellect's ability to apprehend nec-
essary connections? I believe that this claim does not give Zabarella 
enough credit. Admittedly, he thinks that induction will get us to a uni-
versally applicable concept of change, but there is a bit more going on 
here than appears in the rather perfunctory induction Zabarella pro-
vides. 
A clue to what is going on is given a bit later in the treatise on prime 
matter: "For unless we observe water cease to be and changed into air, 
we could know by no reason that these bodies are composed of matter 
and form. Instead, we would think them completely simple."2\) It is only 
because we observe (inspicere) natural objects changing that we can 
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begin to think. about the fact that they are composites of matter and 
form. So, too, then, through induction, Zabarella is making the point 
that our knowledge of the existence of matter can arise only from a 
given observational experience of change. By expanding the claim that 
accidental changes require a subject matter into the universal claim 
that all change requires a subject matter, Zabarella advances to a uni-
versal claim about all change. That premise granted, and the additional 
observational fact of natural change, he can conclude to the existence of 
prime matter as underwriting natural change. While Zabarella is a 
realist and essentialist about natures, it does not follow that he thinks 
those natures are simply given by the intellect. Instead, he has shown 
that there is an interplay between observation, experience, and reason-
ing that stands behind his proof for the existence of matter. It should 
also be noted that he does not yet claim that the knowledge reached by 
induction and resolution is revelatory of the nature of matter. All he 
has done is show that if there is accidental change, there is also sub-
stantial change. Items in the world are not eternal, but come into being 
and perish. The analogy with bronze does no more at this point than 
explain what it is that all change has in common. After all, it is hardly 
implausible to call both the heating of water when it is cold and the 
evaporation of water instances of change. 
Since he has been accused of confusion in arguing by induction to 
the presence of an unobservable cause, it is worth considering one more 
point raised by the induction Zabarella uses.21 As we saw above, he is 
quite clear that induction cannot be used to argue for something unob-
servable, but the induction Zabarella gives does not conclude to some-
thing unobservable. All it does is suggest that there is an analogy or 
similarity between our observation of cold water being heated and our 
observation of water evaporating. Based on the similarity among these 
two observations, he arrives at a universal judgment about change, 
based on the observation of accidental change. Once he has an under-
standing of the similarity among types of change, thanks to analogical 
reasoning, he can grasp the universal major premise of the resolutive 
argument from the effect. It is that argument, not the induction, that is 
used to argue for the unobservable existence of prime matter. 
3. Discovering the Essence of Matter 
So far, we have seen, Zabarella provides a resolutive argument for the 
existence of matter in natural bodies based on a notion of substantial 
change arrived at through induction. But the proper goal of scientific 
methodology is to explain effects in the natural world by their proper 
causes. Accordingly, he must explain what exactly substantial change 
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is through understanding clearly its proper cause. This is the final 
stage of the regressus, in which the major premise of its first demon-
stration is converted and used to show that the previously argued-for 
effect is, once clearly understood, the cause of the observationally 
known feature of the world essentially connected with the cause. In 
other words, we must come to an understanding of matter such that we 
recognize matter to be the cause of substantial change, and not just 
something that has an essential connection to substantial change. 
From the mere fact of the existence of matter, though, we are in no 
position to explain how it is that matter is a cause of substantial 
change. The next step in the theory of demonstrative regress consists in 
rendering the confused knowledge of the discovered nature into a dis-
tinct knowledge of the nature such that we understand it to be a cause. 
This task is accomplished by a "mental examination" or "consideration" 
(mentale examen seu consideratio) of the cause, or, in the traditional 
language of regressus theorists, a negotiatio intellectus. His schematic 
account of this mental consideration in the fifth chapter of the De 
regressu is justly famous. He continues using prime matter as his 
example: 
In the first place, he [Aristotle] explained how matter differed from 
privation, for it is the function of matter to stand under contraries, 
and to receive them, but it is the function of contraries to drive one 
another mutually out of the same matter. Therefore, matter 
remains beneath both contraries and is never destroyed. And since 
the principle of all natural bodies, which must be matter, also must 
be suited to receive every form and every privation, therefore, 
according to its proper nature, matter must be committed to no 
form, no definite nature, and no affection, but free of and immune 
to all these, since what appears within prevents the attachment of 
any extraneous thing to it. Matter must, then, according to its own 
nature, lack every form and possess the capacity to receive all 
forms. This is, without doubt, the nature of matter, that it be noth-
ing in actuality, but all things potentially, for all things fall under 
it.22 
A bit later he continues: 
We easily come to know that such matter is a cause of generation 
because it has the power of receiving every form, and it prescribes 
no certain form for itself, but is equally suited to receive a form and 
its privation. Therefore, it happens that nothing having matter can 
be perpetual, but is necessarily at some time corrupted, and from it 
another is generated.23 
I have quoted these two passages at some length not only because of 
their importance in determining the shape of Zabarella's regress argu-
ment concerning the essence of matter, but also because it has been 
88 
SOUTHIZABARELLA AND PRIME MA'ITER 
claimed that the second passage follows from the first, only because of a 
"startling illogicality" on Zabarella's part.24 I am not so sure. One rea-
son why I worry about too quickly accusing Zabarella of illogicality is 
that the discussion of the distinct knowledge of matter as a cause is 
given in much greater depth in the treatise on prime matter than in 
the brief discussion of the De regressu. Putting that consideration aside 
for the moment, though, I am not certain that there is even an illogical-
ity present in the De regressu since there is another crucial claim that 
connects these two passages: 
Now, what led us to this knowledge is first that confused knowl-
edge of matter that was previously given, and then that comparison 
with generation by which it was discovered. Thus we learn little by 
little what place matter has in generation and what its function is 
so that we may distinguish it from the functions of other principles. 
Once the function is known, the individual conditions come into the 
light that are necessary for it to be able to serve a given function.25 
Zabarella does not try to argue from the fact that matter is pure poten-
tiality to the claim that matter is the cause of generation - that is, sub-
stantial change-without any intermediate step. It is only if the inter-
mediate step does no useful work for the argument that we could claim 
an illogicality. But the intermediate step is precisely the famous mental 
consideration of the regress us theory, and Zabarella makes it quite 
clear in the passage quoted immediately above that the mental consid-
eration involves learning ''little by little" the nature of matter and that 
learning can only be done by discovering matter's function. 
Subsequently, from a discovery of its function, the conditions of matter 
become clear through an extended investigation. It is only after this 
lengthy consideration that we can say that we know distinctly the 
nature of matter as it is the cause of substantial change. This lengthy 
consideration is not given in the De regressu, though, and the reader of 
Zabarella must tum to the treatment of the nature of matter in the De 
prima rerum materia for a full example of a mental consideration. 
Hence, I will defer a decision about Zabarella's illogicality for now, 
instead turning to his attempt to take the confused cognition of matter 
previously discovered through the demonstration from an effect and 
clarify it in such a way as to render his knowledge of matter distinct. 
4. The Mental Consideration of the De prima rerum materia 
The purpose of the mental consideration is to provide us with the 
nature and conditions (conditiones) of the cause. Arriving at a distinct 
knowledge of this cause, we can then demonstrate why an effect follows 
from its cause. This is an important consideration, since it shapes the 
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entire focus of Zabarella's investigation. The effect that he is trying to 
understand is substantial change. And what he wants to prove is that 
prime matter explains substantial change. He can do so only if he can 
show, by mental consideration, that we can assert that where matter 
exists, there is substantial change. That is, he must show that the 
major premise of the demonstration from the effect is convertible. At 
the same time, he can take for granted the conclusion of his proof for 
the existence of matter, so that he knows that there is a connection 
between matter and natural bodies. Thus, we have the following argu-
ment: 
(1) Where there is matter, there is substantial change. 
(2) In natural bodies there is matter. 
Therefore, 
(3) In natural bodies there is substantial change. 
The mental consideration that Zabarella elaborates on in the De prima 
rerum materia is lengthy and rather technical. In what follows, I will 
do no more than highlight the most important points he makes in light 
of what he needs for the regress argument: a clear knowledge of the 
nature of matter that makes it convertible with substantial change. 
As we saw, though, Zabarella makes a distinction between two 
notions of matter: matter considered as it is in itself, and matter con-
sidered as it is a principle of things. It is the latter notion that he uses 
for his mental consideration. Now, in considering matter as it relates to 
other principles of things, Zabarella tells us that there are two primary 
attributes of matter: privation and potency. These are, recall, the two 
terms he contrasts to matter in the De regressu. Thus, the extended 
discussion of privation and potency in relation to matter considered as 
a principle of things is just what one would expect in light of that pro-
grammatic text. 
Privation is not to be confused with negation. Negation is the univer-
sal absence of all forms, while privation is a principle of natural things 
insofar as it is the terminus a quo of generation and the terminus ad 
quem of destruction. Accordingly, privation is always conjoined with 
some prior form generating that form to which the privation is opposed, 
and constituting in matter the potency for receiving some subsequent 
form. The idea here is simple enough. Privation, as opposed to simple 
absence or negation, occurs only when there is a transition from one 
form to another and the privation attached to the first form is such 
that the second form can actually arise from it. So, for example, it is 
wrong to say that a stone possesses the privation of human nature. The 
stone simply lacks human nature because a stone can never become 
human. By contrast, the privation of human nature does exist along 
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with human seed, since that seed is precisely something out of which 
human nature arises. Privation, then, serves two functions in an 
account of any change, whether substantial or accidental.26 
Given this general understanding of privation, what is the precise 
way in which it can be an attribute of matter? The key point for our 
purpose is that privation must accompany matter insofar as privation 
is necessary for generation. This necessity means that while matter 
absolutely considered can exist without privation, just as it can exist 
without form, nonetheless generation cannot be explained without both 
matter and privation. As Zabarella puts it: "It is necessary that what-
ever is generated is generated from matter having been deprived [pri-
vata]."27 His point is simple enough. Any change requires matter, priva-
tion, and form. Take away anyone of these principles and no change is 
possible. But that just means that if we consider matter as a principle, 
not as it is in itself, we never find it existing without privation. In fact, 
Zabarella states this conclusion even more strongly: Taking matter as a 
principle of things, matter is always formed (formatam) and qualified 
(qualem) since privation and potency exist in it.2B 
As this last assertion makes clear, it is not only privation that exists 
as a necessary attribute of matter when it is considered as a principle 
of things; potency is also an attribute of matter so considered. There is 
an immediate complication, though, in Zabarella's discussion, since he 
goes on to make a distinction between universal and particular 
potency. Matter is said to have universal potency insofar as it is indif-
ferent to any form or privation, while it has particular potency insofar 
as it is determined and restricted to receive one form and not another. 
This latter feature of matter is not due to the nature of matter itself, 
but rather to an agent preparing the matter for receiving one form and 
not some other form. Particular potency also includes the status of mat-
ter as it is already informed, that is, as it possesses certain qualities 
that predispose it to develop in one way and not another. So, for exam-
ple, an acorn has a particular potency to become an oak tree given its 
form and qualities, and, for that reason, it cannot become a cat. This 
distinction between universal and particular potency requires Zabarella 
to take into account both sorts of potency in his discussion of matter 
considered as a principle of things. 29 
Unlike the particular potency of matter, its universal potency is 
merely its ability to receive all forms. This potency is the very essence 
of matter in its role as a principle of things. For this reason, we can say 
that it is because matter has the potentiality to receive all forms that it 
is a material principle. This universal potency, then, is as it were the 
nature (ratio) and form of matter, and Zabarella concludes: ''When we 
consider matter as a principle, the essence of matter is directed to 
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receiving a form. "30 By contrast, the particular potency of matter is not 
essential to it. This fact should not surprise us, since that which is acci-
dental to something is what it does not need in order to be in potency or 
to exist actually. But matter does not need to be the matter of a human 
being to exist; it need only be the principle of something else. Since no 
one particular potency can prevent matter from being able to be a prin-
ciple of something, particular potency is not essential. So too, matter 
must be able to exist without a particular potency. After all, how could 
it receive a particular potency if it did not already exist?31 At the same 
time, though, Zabarella does not want us to forget that even in the case 
of particular potency, we need to distinguish between the potency it 
has to a form and that which makes it to be the form of one kind of 
thing and not another. In the case of the acorn, we need to recognize 
that the matter of the acorn has a potency to receive the acorn's form, 
and as potency to receiving form, it is essential to the nature of matter, 
not merely accidental; it is part of the very nature of the acorn's matter 
considered as a principle. The accidental feature of matter's particular 
potency is found only in its having been prepared by some prior priva-
tion for taking on a particular form. Therefore, Zabarella thinks that 
even the particular potency of matter is essential to matter insofar as it 
is a potency to receive a form. It is only its potency to receive some par-
ticular form that is accidental to the nature ofmatter.32 
5. Conclusion: The Essence of Matter and the Completion of 
the Regressus 
From this brief account of Zabarella's view concerning matter as a prin-
ciple of things, we can return to the question of the strength of his 
claim that matter is the cause of substantial change. Recall that the 
worry involved seeing how, from the mere assertion that matter is not 
a privation and does not possess any form intrinsically, Zabarella could 
derive a distinct knowledge of matter as the cause of natural change. 
By bringing in a consideration of the essence of matter from the De 
prima rerum materia, however, I hope to have shown that there is not 
a "startling illogicality" involved. In his ex professo methodological, 
albeit schematic, treatment of the mental consideration required for 
regressus, he explicitly called for an investigation of the function and 
conditions of the effect demonstrated through the first stage of the 
regressus. In his discussion of privation and potency, he has provided 
that investigation. That he fails to do so in the De regressu may be 
unfortunate, but it is an oversight amply compensated for in the De 
prima rerum materia. 
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The account that emerges through the extended mental considera-
tion is one in which we are led to acknowledge that matter as a princi-
ple of things has a nature such that it can explain substantial change. 
By virtue of its association with privation and its universal and particu-
lar potency to receive any form, it is clear that any change is dependent 
on matter. Thus, we can happily explain substantial change by refer-
ence to the nature of matter without the threat of startling illogicality. 
Indeed, we are led to see that matter must have a connection with sub-
stantial change, and that the connection must be a causal one. 
Nonetheless, it is worth reflecting on why it is that Zabarella views 
matter in this way. And here he is quite explicit and frank. He tells us 
that the analogy with the statue is at the root of his choice of 
attributes: 
For after we discover that matter exists through substantial 
change, we consider that it thus relates to things that arise from it, 
as bronze relates to the statue whose matter it is. And since the 
relation [ratio] of bronze to the statue is known, hence we conclude 
to what the relation of prime matter is to things that arise from it. 
For, before bronze receives the form of the statue, it is not actually, 
but only potentially, the statue. Therefore, since the relation of 
prime matter to all things is the same as the relation of bronze to 
the statue, matter also will not be anything actual from things, but 
will be all things potentially.33 
This admission on Zabarella's part is striking confirmation of his thor-
ough Aristotelian commitments. It turns out that the entire account of 
matter spins out of his meditation on a basic example provided by 
Aristotle and his use of the elaborate regress us method ultimately leads 
to a systematic appreciation of, and justification for, this example. 
While one might wonder about the wisdom of subscribing to this 
account of matter in the first place, and thereby accuse Zabarella of 
only explaining Aristotle and not discovering for himself the truth 
about matter, such an accusation would not worry him. Mter all, 
explaining Aristotle's text and arguing in an Aristotelian manner are 
his stated purposes in the treatise on prime matter.34 Yet Zabarella is 
no mere servile expositor of Aristotle's texts despite his intentions. His 
account of Aristotle is deeply systematic, indeed, systematic in ways 
that Aristotle is not. For this reason, trying to understand one thread of 
Zabarella's thought requires familiarity with his entire corpus. Logical 
problems quickly become methodological ones, but the methodological 
ones presuppose accounts of knowledge and its acquisition. The ingenu-
ity, power, and consistency of his defense of Aristotle are quite powerful 
rethinkings of the Aristotelian tradition. Indeed, this strikingly thor-
ough defense of Aristotle is not one found in Aristotle's text, and 
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Zabarella's philosophical creativity is better viewed in this light than in 
any purported imperfect foreshadowing of subsequent thinkers. 
Moreover, I have tried to show that he succeeded-on his terms-in 
providing both a systematic method that would justifY his defense of 
Aristotle and that his extended application of that method is not obvi-
ously flawed in its logic. We might have wanted Zabarella to do some-
thing different, but he can hardly be faulted for carrying out his stated 
intention in an ingenious and powerful way. 
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2. Jacopo Zabarella, De prima rerum materia, bk. I, chap. 6, col. 142C-D: 
"Quemadmodum igitur homini alia attribuuntur, quatenus homo, alia, 
quatenus est pater; sic etiam materiae alia sunt attributa secundum pri-
mam eius notionem, et prout ens, alia vero iuxta secundam notionem 
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Zabarella's De rebus naturalibus libri XXX, first published in Venice in 
1590. In what follows, I use the reprint (Frankfurt: Minerva, 1966) of the 
1607 edition of the work published in Frankfurt. The De prima rerum 
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work as DPRM, followed by book, chapter, and column numbers. This and 
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3. DPRM 11.2, 183D: "Sed hac de re Theologicam disputationem dimittamus . 
. . . Consilium meum est non Theologice, sed Aristotelice disputare." 
4. DPRM 1.1, 133E: ''Nisus fuero veritatem, et Aristotelis de prima materia 
sententiam (si possim) reddere clariorem." 
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5. DPRM 1.2, 135D-E: "Generari autem et interire dicimus proprie quidem et 
absolute substantias, accidentia vero minu proprie, et (ut vocant) secun-
dum quid: nam si ex aere aqua generetur, aquam fieri simpliciter dicimus; 
si vero aqua ex fugida fiat calida, non simpliciter dicimus aquam fieri, 
sed aquam fieri calidam; unde colligimus, eandem mutationem in acciden-
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est transitus a fugido in calidum, a forma ad formam, et (ut vocant) a pos-
itivo ad positivum, eatenus vocatur motus." 
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the treatise and its background can be found in Antonino Poppi, La dott-
rina della scienza in Giacomo Zabarella (Padua: Antenore, 1972), pp. 277-
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and "Aristotelianism in the Veneto and the Origins of Modern Science: 
Some Considerations on the Problem of Continuity," in vol. 1 of 
Aristotelismo Veneto e scienza moderna, pp. 104-24; Giovanni Papuli, "La 
teoria del regress us come metodo scientifico negli autori della Scuola di 
Padova," ibid., pp. 221-78; Wilhelm Risse, "Zabarellas Methodenlehre," 
ibid., pp. 155-72. Particularly significant is the essay by Nicholas Jardine, 
"Galileo's Road to Truth and the Demonstrative Regress," Studies in the 
History and Philosophy of Science 7 (1976), pp. 277-318. All of these works 
build on and react to the pioneering work of John H. Randall's The School 
of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science (Padua: Antenore, 1961). 
Randall argues that Zabarella's view is a logic of investigation and discov-
ery. Note that this book was based on a paper published in 1940 titled 
''The Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua," Journal of 
the History of Ideas I (1940), pp. 177-206. For a later restatement of his 
view, see "Paduan Aristotelianism Reconsidered," in Philosophy and 
Humanism: Renaissance Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller, ed. 
Edward P. Mahoney (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 
275-82. See also the defense of Randall by William F. Edwards, "Randall 
on the Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua," in 
Naturalism and Historical Understanding, ed. John P. Anton (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1967), pp. 53-68. A modified version of the thesis that 
Aristotelianism played a key role in the development of modern scientific 
method can be found in a series of articles and books by William A. 
Wallace. See, as examples, "Reinterpreting Galileo on the Basis of his 
Latin Manuscripts," in Reinterpreting Galileo, Studies in Philosophy and 
the History of Philosophy, vol. 15, ed. William A. Wallace (Washington 
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1986), pp. 3-28; and "Randall 
Redivivus: Galileo and the Paduan Aristotelians," Journal of the History of 
Ideas 49 (1988), pp. 133-49. 
7. Zabarella, De regressu, 1, 481C-D, in his Opera logica (Cologne, 1597): 
"Est enim reciprocata quaedam demonstratio, qua postquam causam igno-
tam ex effectu noto demonstravimus, maiorem propositionem conver-
timus, et eundem effectum per eandem causam demonstramus, ut scia-
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mus propter quid sit." I have used the 1966 reprint of the 1597 edition of 
the Opera logica (Hildesheim: Ohms, 1966). I cite this work by chapter 
and column numbers. The translation is mine. Zabarella first published 
the De regressu as well as the other logical treatises I use in this essay at 
Venice in 1578. I would like to thank John Longeway for many helpful 
conversations about Zabarella's logical writings. 
8. See Schmitt's "Experience and Experiment" for an extended discussion of 
Zabarella's notion of discovery. I hope to treat this issue in more detail on 
a later occasion. 
9. DPRM 1.3, 136D. 
10. DPRM 1.3, 136E. 
11. DPRM 1.3, 136F: "Haec enim est vis inductionis demonstrativae, ut ex 
aliquorum particularium enumeratione in lucem prodeat praedicati cum 
subjecto essentialis connexus, unde cognoscamus ita esse in reliquis." 
12. Zabarella, De regressu 4, 484E-F: "Effectum confusem cognoscimus, 
quando absque causae cognitione novimus ipsum esse: distincte vero, 
quando per cognitionem causae: illa quidem dicitur cognitio quod est, haec 
vero propter quid est et simul etiam quid est: quoniam idem est 
cognoscere propter quid est .... Datur tamen causae quoque cognitio tum 
confusa, tum distincta: confusa quidem, quando ipsam esse cognoscimus, 
sed quidnam sit ignoramus: distincta vero, quando cognoscimus etiam 
quid sit, et ipsius naturam penetramus." 
13. Zabarella, De methodis, 111.17, 265F-266A, in his Opera Logica: "Omnis 
enim a noto ad ignotum scientificus progressus vel a causa est ad effec-
tum, vel ab effectu ad causam; illa quidem est methodus demonstrativa, 
haec autem resolutiva; alius processus, qui certam rei notitiam pariat, non 
datur: nam si ab aliquo ad aliquod progrediamur, quorum neutrum 
alterius causa sit, non potest inter illa esse connexus essentialis, ac neces-
sarius. Quare nulla certa cognitio illum progressum consequi potest; patet 
igitur, nullam dari scientifica methodum praeter demonstrativam, et reso-
lutivam." I cite this work by book, chapter, and column number. The 
translation is mine. 
14. Zabarella also makes a distinction between two types of induction, dialec-
tical and demonstrative. Dialectical induction requires us to know every 
particular that falls under the induction. It is only demonstrative induc-
tion that helps us to know the causes of things since it alone can go from 
some observable cases to an inference about all cases. For the distinction 
between the two kinds of induction, see De regressu, 4, 485C-D. 
15. This paragraph and the next summarize the De methodis, 111.19. 
16. DPRM lA, 137D-E. Aristotle famously uses the example of bronze and the 
statue in relation to change and matter at Physics 1.7, 191a9-12. 
17. DPRM lA, 137E-F: "Analogia enim est proportio, quae quum fit simili-
tudo rationum, non potest esse inter duo, sed est inter quatuor, quia ratio 
est inter duo, quare dum duas rationes inter se comparamus, et similes 
esse dicimus, quatuor terminos consideramus, vel tres, si unus bis 
96 
SOUTH/ZABARELLA AND PRIME MA'ITER 
sumatur, et teneat locum duorum; dicimus enim, quaternarium ad bina-
rium habere rationem duplam, sic duodenarium ad senarium habere 
rationem duplam; quum ergo eadem utrobique sit ratio, dicimus ita se 
habere duodenarium ad senarium, ut se habet quaternarius ad binarium, 
eaque vocatur analogia." 
18. DPRM lA, 138A: "Et ita per hanc analogiam cognoscitur prima materia, 
quia proportione respondet subiecto mutationis accidentalis." 
19. Jardine, "Galileo's Road to Truth and the Demonstrative Regress," p. 301. 
It is unfortunate that in Jardine's very useful essay, he supplies Zabarella 
with an account of cognition which Zabarella does not hold. Jardine 
believes that Zabarella's identification of the Agent Intellect with God 
means that God reveals the essential natures of things. To the contrary, 
Zabarella's identification of the Agent Intellect with God has little bearing 
on his account of intellectual cognition, which is instead based on a rejec-
tion of standard medieval abstractionist accounts of knowledge. It is that 
mistake that underwrites Jardine's assertion of bland confidence. For an 
overview of Zabarella's account of human cognition, see Poppi, La 
Dottrina della Scienza in Giacomo Zabarella, pp. 65-130. I have made an 
initial attempt to show the orientation of Zabarella's account of human 
knowledge in my essay "Zabarella and the Intentionality of Sensation," 
Rivista di storia della filosofia 57 (2002), pp. 5-25. 
20. DPRM I.5, 139F: "Nisi enim interire aquam, et in aerem mutari videre-
mus, nulla ratione cognoscere posseramus corpora haec ex materia et 
forma constare, sed simplicia penitus esse putaremus." 
21. In "Galileo's Road to Truth and the Demonstrative Regress," p. 300, 
Jardine claims that Zabarella is guilty of contradiction in holding that (a) 
induction does not reach beyond what is observable and that (b) the 
demonstration from an effect that he uses to prove the existence of prime 
matter goes beyond what is observable and yet relies on induction. 
22. Zabarella, De regressu, 5, 488C-E: "Docuit in primis quomodo a privatione 
differat: materiae namque officium est substare contrariis, et ea recipere: 
contrariorum vero officium est se ab eadem materia mutuo pellere: ideo 
materia manet sub utroque contrario, et nunquam interit: et, quum 
omnium naturalium corporum principium, et materia esse debeat, debet 
etiam esse talis, quae omnes formas, et omnes privationes recipere apta 
sit: itaque nulli formae, nulli certae naturae, nulli affectioni addicta esse 
debet secundum propriam eius naturam, sed ab omnibus libera, et immu-
nis: quia intus apparens prohibet extraneum: debet igitur materia secun-
dum suam naturam carere omnibus formis, et omnium recipiendarum 
potestatem habere: haec absque dubio est natura materiae ut nihil sit 
actu, sed potestate omnia, in hunc enim sensum cadunt omnia." 
23. Zabarella, De regressu, 5, 488F: "Facile nobis innotescit, talem materiam 
generationis causam esse: quoniam enim potestatem habet recipiendi 
omnes formas, et nullam certam formam sibi praescribit, sed aeque apta 
est recipere formam, et eius privationem: ideo facit ut nullum materiam 
habens possit esse perpetuum, sed ex necessitate aliquando intereat, et ex 
eo aliud generetur." 
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24. Jardine, "Galileo's Road to Truth and the Demonstrative Regress," p. 302. 
25. Zabarella, De regressu, 5, 488E: "Ad eam autem cognitionem nos duxit 
tum cognitio illa praecedens confusa quod materia detur, tum eius compa-
ratio cum generatione , ex qua fuit inventa: sic enim paulatim discimus, 
quem locum in generatione habeat ipsa materia, et quod nam eius offi-
cium sit, idque ab aliorum principiorum muneribus distinguimus: officio 
cognito conditiones singulae in lucem prodeunt, quae ut fungi tali officio 
possit, necessariae sunt." 
26. See DPRM 1.7, 145-51 for an extended discussion of privation, absence, 
and negation. 
27. DPRM 1.8, 152C: "Necessarium enim est ut quidquid generatur, generetur 
ex materia privata." 
28. DPRM 1.8, 153A. 
29. DPRM 1.10, 159-60. 
30. DPRM 1.13, 169-70. The quotation appears at 170C: "Nam essentia mate-
riae ad formam recipiendam dirigitur, dum materiam at principium con-
sideramus." 
31. DPRM 1.14, 171A. 
32. DPRM 1.14, 171E-F. 
33. DPRM 1.5, 138F-139A: "Postquam enim materiam dari per substantiae 
mutationem invenimus, consideramus eam ita se habere ad res, quae ex 
ipsa fiunt, ut se habet aes ad statuam cuius est materia, et quum ratio 
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est actu statua, sed potestate: quoniam igitur eadem est primae materiae 
ratio ad res omnes, quae aeris ad statuam, materia quoque non erit ulla 
ex rebus actu, sed omnes potestate." 
34. For a helpful discussion of Zabarella's explicit defense of his practice, see 
Antonino Poppi, "Zabarella, or Aristotelianism as a Rigorous Science," in 
The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy, ed. Riccardo Pozzo 
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), pp. 
35-63. Poppi summarizes Zabarella's position: "One should not see, how-
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98 
j 
